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The ALI's Complex Litigation Project: A State Judge's
View
Herbert P. Wilkins*
I set forth some observations on the American Law Institute's Complex
Litigation Project from a state judge's perspective. I participated, in a peripheral
way, as an adviser to the Project from the preliminary study through the final
report. Professor Arthur R. Miller of Harvard Law School and Dean Mary Kay
Kane of the Hastings College of Law, the reporter and associate reporter, worked
diligently and thoughtfully to produce an admirable and sound proposal for the
improved handling of one of the most difficult problems in the administration of
justice in this country.
At the May 1987 annual meeting of the American Law Institute, Professor
Miller presented a report representing a Preliminary Study of Complex Litigation.
This formidable preliminary effort set forth Professor Miller's observations on
the possible scope and likely complexity of the proposed subject. Looking back
at the preliminary outline of the project, with the benefit of having the Proposed
Final Draft (April 5, 1993) of the Complex Litigation Project in hand, one must
be impressed with the clear road map that Professor Miller drew at the very
beginning of the Complex Litigation Project.
That is not to say, however, that the route to be followed on that map was
firmly established from the start. The possible scope of the effort was well-
defined, but some courses ultimately to be traveled were not yet anticipated. It
was not as clear at the inception as it became later, for example, that a draft
federal act would be an indispensable component of the final report. It surely
was not clear then that the difficulty of preparing a workable plan for
consolidating state cases in one state court from other state courts would become
so problematical (in the minds of most of the advisers) that the final draft of the
report would back away from advancing a firm proposal for action in this area.
The report would present the reporter's proposed model system for state-to-state
transfer and consolidation only as a reporter's study.'
Nor was it clear at the early stages of the Project, at least to me, how
important and time-consuming the subject of choice of law would become in the
development and approval of the final draft. Dean Mary Kay Kane, not then
even an adviser, was to become an indispensable associate reporter and would
carry the major burden on the important subject of choice of law. Perhaps the
most interesting and important point of the conflict-of-laws aspect of the project
was the nearly universal acceptance of the concept that any federal statute would
have to prescribe fairly rigid choice-of-law rules. Among a group largely raised
to reject the application of rigid conflicts rules and to admire case-by-case,
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center-of-gravity applications, it is surprising that the need for fixed, but not
wholly rigid, choice-of-law principles was so readily accepted. There were, of
course, substantial battles over what those rules should be. For the objects of the
project to be achieved, however, the substance of the rules falls second to the
need for specific guiding conflicts rules. The uncertainty as to what state's law
applies to a case or to an issue can make the settlement of a case greatly more
difficult than where the choice of law is clear. The same is often true in -the
attempted settlement of cases where the existence and scope of insurance
coverage is unclear.2
From the beginning it was established what complex litigation meant for the
purposes of this endeavor. The complexity of a single case, however
unmanageable, was not the area of concern. A particular case, of course, may
present most difficult questions of procedural and substantive law, may involve
many parties, and may concern a subject that is obscure even for experts in the
relevant field (much less for juries and judges). The concern of the Project,
however, was with litigation having a different quality of complexity, that is,
litigation involving many parties and cases in more than one jurisdiction.? The
goal was to define when and how to consolidate cases in one court if they
involved one or more common questions of fact." The transfer and
consolidation of cases could be justified in general only if the process would tend
to reduce or eliminate duplication of effort, reduce litigation costs, or tend to
eliminate inconsistent adjudications and ease the burden on courts.5 Moreover,
no decision to transfer and consolidate would be warranted without considering
whether it would be fair to the parties to do so. 6 A substantial portion of the
project is devoted to the expression of the way by which these general principles
should be implemented.
The project's final draft is not free from controversy, as other articles in this
symposium issue demonstrate. Several of the areas of contention surfaced early
among the advisers. The project calls for the removal of cases from the control of
2. The advisers were not selected with particular attention to their conflict-of-laws skills. They
were, rather, people noted as proceduralists or as experts in multi-state, multi-party litigation (and a
few generalists, such as this article's author).
The substantial absence of conflicts experts front the advisers may have helped in bringing about
the proposed final draft, if one considers the diversity of opinion and the firmness of view that
appears to be an indispensable generic aspect of professors of conflict of laws as a class. I do not
mean to imply, however, that the procedttralists among the advisers were not assertive and articulate.
My previous experience as an American Law Institute adviser has been with Restatement of Property
(Third) projects. Property law professors are somewhat relaxed and reflective, not moved to engage
in immediate aggressive assaults on legal problems. They know that the property will be there
tomorrow, next week, and probably next year. Proceduralists, on the other hand, aware that an issue
may be waived, lost because not raised, or made moot with the passage of time, are wont to launch
immediate, forceftl analysis of a problem lest it disappear.
3. See Proposed Final Draft, at 1-2.
4. Id. § 3:01(a).
5. Id. § 3:01(b)(1).
6. Id. § 3:01(b)(2).
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plaintiffs' counsel. Thus, plaintiffs' causes of action would be subjected to
collective treatment, often in a court not of the plaintiffs' choosing and under the
influence of lead counsel also not of plaintiffs' choosing. One adviser persistently
challenged the propriety of collectivizing claims without the approval of individual
plaintiffs. This theme in several variations will be played repeatedly when and if
federal legislation is sought to put the project's proposals into effect.
Fairness is an important factor in the consolidation decision, but plaintiffs'
rights to self-rule (which often sounds as the rights of counsel) cannot become a
dominant theme. Transfer and consolidation are indispensable elements of any
worthwhile attempt to control and dispose of complex litigation. Plaintiffs'
"inalienable" rights to control their own litigation will have to be sacrificed where
the greater benefit to the courts and the litigation process warrants it. It should be
noted that there are many advantages for a plaintiff whose case is consolidated for
treatment with other similar cases.'
At an early point in the advisers' meetings, federal judges expressed concern
that the proposed consolidation process seemed to be focused on putting more
business into the federal judicial system, a system that they viewed as already
seriously overburdened. Although the project recognizes that a state court may be
the court to which all cases are transferred,' it is probably true that the dominant
intersystem flow of cases would be from state courts to federal courts. Even if this
would be the case, there would be a likely net benefit from the efficient disposition
of federal cases transferred to a single federal court (even if some state cases were
consolidated there as well).
Federal judges' concern that no additional burden should be placed on the
federal judicial system cannot be permitted to control the debate over the
implementation of the complex litigation project. First, the federal judicial system
has financial resources that exceed what state judiciaries have available to them.
Second, because this project deals with litigation that by definition is not
concentrated in one state, it touches national or at least regional concerns. It is
hardly surprising that logic would point to the federal courts as the appropriate fora
to deal with many such problems. One would suspect that the net burden, if any,
on the federal judicial system (as opposed to the burden on a given federal judge
who is assigned the consolidated cases) would not be great. One would be
warranted in concluding that complex litigation cases would more justifiably be
placed in the federal system than simple diversity, cases. The problem is a national
one for whose solution the involvement of federal courts will be needed in specific
instances.
7. Fairness can be argued in a due process of law context. With the enactment of legislation
clearly directed to solving a chronic, national litigation problem and with the public interest in the
enacted solution filly documented by the final report and congressional hearings, one may hope that
the Supreme Court of the United States (whose junior member was an adviser on the project) will
put any individual's due process fairness argument in proper context.
8. See Proposed Final Draft. § 4:01.
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As a state judge, I have no problem with the fact that the operation of the
proposed system will result in cases being taken away from state court jurisdiction
on a standard of freer mobility than that applied in traditional removal cases. That
will be the inevitable and necessary consequence of the efficient transfer and
consolidation of cases by the complex litigation panel. Similarly, I have no
difficulty in accepting into the state judicial system those cases that meet the
standard for the panel's transfer of federal and state cases to a state court. These
cases in large measure are cases that could have been commenced in the courts of
the transferee state, and the legal issues are ones to be decided under the law of the
transferee state.
As I have said, the Project does not provide a mechanism for the transfer of
cases from the courts of one or more states for consolidation with cases in another
state. In this sense, the Project is incomplete.' It is this aspect of the preliminary
study that ultimately was diverted to Appendix B as a reporter's study, showing
what a model of a compact or uniform act might look like. Professor Miller did not
initiate such a change of plan with any enthusiasm, but he recognized that the
substantial concern over state-to-state consolidation, which I shall discuss shortly,
could threaten the implementation of the entire Project. A distinct majority of the
advisers favored eliminating state-to-state transfer and consolidation from the initial
proposals of the Project. It was suggested that the removal of such a proposal
would make the Project more salable. One could argue that the American Law
Institute should always take the intellectually proper position on a legal point
without regard to the consequences. I acknowledge that I made no such argument.
Professor Miller reluctantly decided to follow the advice of a majority of his
advisers, although it would have been his right to press the point on the floor of the
Institute's annual meeting."
The opposition to the inclusion of a plan for state-to-state transfer and
consolidation was based on several considerations, none of which challenged the
soundness of such consolidations in theory and in particular instances. To many
the process proposed for consolidation seemed unwieldy, unavoidably so to be sure,
9. See Proposed Final Draft, Appendix B. Introductory Note (a), at 559 ("no transfer and
consolidation system would be complete or fully effective without a procedure for moving complex
cases from one state cout to another").
10. State-to-state transfer makes as much sense as state-to-federal and federal-to-federal transfers.
Claims arising from the collapse of a bridge or other structure, for example, would involve questions
of law of the state where the stnucture existed, and the issues of fact would generally involve local
events and evidence available in the locality. The various claims should be tried as to liability, at
least, in one consolidated case in one court. That court probably should be a local state court.
However, if one or more actions are brought in the courts of another state, that consolidation will not
happen under the proposed complex litigation project, unless there is also an action in a Federal
District Court and the complex litigation panel decides to designate the stale court pursuant to the
terms of § 4.01 of the Report. It is this kind of relatively straightforward, consolidated complex
litigation action from which initial experiences in transfer and consolidation might best be derived,
rather than from a mass tort case (e.g.. asbestos. DES) where all the plaintiffs are not immediately
ascertainable, the applicable law is in doubt, and all the defendants are not clearly identifiable.
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but nevertheless unwieldy. A judge would have to be appointed from each
participating state to an interstate complex litigation panel." Differences in
procedural rules among states (such as the scope of discovery and the availability
of jury trials) presented a partial obstacle.
Moreover, there was a sense that states were not yet ready for this kind of
process, and that it would be better to see how the federal-federal and state-federal
proposals worked before devoting scarce state judicial and financial resources to
the project. The lack of enthusiasm for state-to-state transfer of cases may be
exemplified by the relatively few states that have rules or statutes authorizing the
certification of questions of state law to that state's highest state court from another
state court (and vice versa).'" Indeed, some states do not have effective devices
for consolidating multiple litigation in different counties within the jurisdiction.
There was a further, somewhat practical consideration that influenced some
advisers not to favor setting up a state-to-state procedure at this time. In most,
perhaps nearly all, instances of complex litigation as defined by the project, there
would be at least one case entered in a federal district court. If there were such a
federal case, the transfer and consolidation provisions set forth elsewhere in the
proposed project could be used to achieve desirable consolidations, even in a state
court.'3 It is true, however, that the standard that would warrant the complex
litigation panel's designation of a state court as a transferee court 4 is harder to
meet than the standard for consolidating federal 5 or state' 6 cases in a federal
court.
Thus, it was that the state-to-state transfer and consolidation provision of the
Complex Litigation Project was reduced to a single tentative section urging
consideration of "the formulation of an Interstate Complex Litigation Compact or
a Uniform Complex Litigation Act."' There is a Uniform Transfer of Litigation
Act that the commissioners on uniform state laws approved in 1991.8 One
problem with the uniform act is that it requires the consent of the transferring and
receiving courts on a case-by-case basis.' 9 It is better than nothing, and unless
11. Proposed Final Draft, Appendix B, § 2 (b).
12. Since 1971, my court has had a rule allowing the highest court of another state to certify a
question of Massachusetts law to it. Mass. Supreme Judicial Court Rule 1:03. We have never
received such a certification from another state, although federal judges have often used the portion
of the rule granting them the right to seek answers to questions that they certify to us. In turn, we
have never certified a question out to another state court. That could be explained by the absence
of any rule or statute in any of the other northeastern states expressing a willingness to receive such
a certification. See John B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins, Interjurisdictional Certification and Choice of
Law, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 411. 431 n.95 (1988).
13. See Proposed Final Draft. § 4.01(b).
14. Id.
15. Id. § 3.01.
16. Id. § 5.01.
17. Id. § 4:02, at 248.
18. See id., Appendix C.
19. Id., Appendix B, at 562.
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some states adopt at least this modest step toward state-to-state transfer and
consolidation, it is questionable whether there will be any near-term support for the
preparation of either an interstate complex litigation compact or a uniform complex
litigation act.
All this having been said, the soundness of the project and its potential benefits
remain clear. State-to-state transfer of cases is not indispensable or even important
at this time. The remaining question is whether effective support for congressional
action will be forthcoming.
